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My view on food security has been strongly influenced by my activities in the 
field of development co-operation. Therefore, I want to start my lecture with a 
short review of some of these activities.  
In Operations Research, my field of specialization, mathematical models are 
used to simulate decision processes. They are applied in almost all sectors of 
economic life, for instance for the planning of industrial processes, medical 
services in hospitals, military operations and transport. I started to apply 
Operations Research techniques to study problems of development in the 1970s, 
when I was a lecturer at the Mathematics Department of the University of Dar es 
Salaam in Tanzania. In those days the view that development equaled 
modernization was still influential. Transfer of capital and technology was to 
speed up the process of modernization. Operations Research was a typical 
example of such a modern technology. I focused my attention on agriculture, the 
backbone of Tanzania’s economy, and in particular on problems of small-scale 
farmers. Together with my students, who nearly all came from rural areas, I 
applied1 Operations Research techniques to study the farming in the students’ 
home villages. The results were discussed in class. It was an eye-opener for the 
students that mathematics could be used to study the farming practices of their 
parents. The Operations Research models served as a “tool of analysis” to better 
comprehend the complex farming systems and to discuss possibilities of 
improvement.  
 
Later, when I was appointed in Groningen, I became very involved in co-
operation with universities in developing countries, in particular with the 
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences of the University of 
Ouagadougou. During the first years of this long term collaboration, the Dutch 
partners helped reorient the curricula from a pure theoretical approach, as 
existed in France, towards a proper balance between theory and practice. 
Although the faculty presently faces many problems, the interrelation between 
theory and the daily problems of Burkina Faso in teaching and research remains 
                                                 
1
 See Schweigman, 1979. 
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a strong point. I also helped set up international research programmes on food 
security in West Africa. In the seventies the Sahelian countries in West Africa 
had been hit by serious droughts and famines. Food security in these countries, 
therefore, became an important item on national and international agenda’s. 
How to cope with risks due to uncertain rainfall became a central topic in our 
research projects. Most projects were interdisciplinary in nature. The agents 
financing these programmes emphasized again and again that the research 
should not only be of academic value, but also of relevance to policy makers. I 
worked together with researchers of both universities and national agricultural 
research institutes. They carried out extensive field research. The set up, 
progress and results of the research were intensively discussed with 
stakeholders. In many cases, methods of Operations Research played an 
important role in structuring the analysis. 
 
Inspired by the experiences of my professional life, I want to discuss today food 
security in Africa. The stagnation of food production in Africa will be the main 
issue. Various actors play a role, such as individual farmers, farmers’ 
organisations, merchants, non-governmental organizations, governments and 
international organisations. I will comment on the role of some of these actors in 
the past, paying particular attention to their aspirations. I will show that 
aspirations that are too ambitious often lead to the exclusion of others actors and 
to failures. The phenomenon of exclusion of other actors will be a continuous 
thread in my lecture, hence the sub-title “ the Illusion of the Exclusive Actor”.  
 
I will divide the text below in three parts. First I will examine the role of various 
actors by reviewing food security issues in Africa in a historical context. In the 
second section I will discuss the actual food security situation in some rural 
areas in Burkina Faso. In the last section on “opportunities and responsibilities”, 
I will draw some conclusions. 
 
 
1. Food Security in Africa in a historical context 
 
Period of decolonization  
After the Second World War, many African nations became independent. 
Economically, these young nations and their inexperienced governments 
depended in many respects on the former colonial powers and other 
industrialized countries. ‘Experts’ from Europe and the USA were important in 
designing development policies. In those years, the view that the western 
‘advanced’ economies with their high levels of mass consumption and advanced 
technology were model for less developed economies received much support2. 
                                                 
2
 See Rostow, 1961. 
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In the debate on development, the term food security was rarely used. The 
debate was centred on industrialisation. It was widely believed, “that 
industrialization was the unique key to development and that the industrial 
sector, as the advanced sector, would pull with it the backward agricultural 
sector”3. In their first plans, the newly independent states strongly emphasized 
the industrial sector. These industrialization policies became a failure, however. 
The targets were set much too high, and could not be reached due to a lack of 
technical know-how and skilled manpower. Indeed, the industrial development 
was very disappointing4 and many young developing countries had to fall back 
upon the agricultural sector for economic survival.  
 
In the 1960s the role of the agricultural sector became increasingly important. 
The governments of developing countries took initiatives to boost the production 
of export crops in order to generate income for the state. A proper balance had to 
be found between the production of cash crops for export and food crops for 
own consumption. In the 1960s and 1970s almost all developing countries 
wanted to be self-sufficient in food production. There were convincing reasons 
for that. The young nations wanted to be independent, not only politically, but 
also economically. Food was a vital good. If they had to rely on foreign 
countries for food, this would restrict their political independence. 
 
Green Revolution 
The importance of food production also became an issue of great international 
concern. In the 1960s and 1970s initiatives were taken to carry out agricultural 
research on an international scale. In these years, several international research 
institutes were established in order to develop improved technologies to increase 
agricultural production. An example is the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) on the Philippines, established in 1960 with strong support of the Ford 
and Rockefeller Foundations. New, so-called high-yielding varieties were 
developed. They usually required high levels of inputs. The introduction of these 
high-yielding varieties was welcomed as the ‘Green Revolution’. In several 
Asian countries, the Green Revolution was a success5. In sub-Saharan Africa the 
                                                 
3
 See Thorbecke, 1969, p. 3; see also Bakker, 1992, p.1. These views were particularly 
popular in the 1950s and early 60s. Soon after, the views were critized. It was claimed that a 
strong agricultural sector was a prerequisite for industrial development. Only the agricultural 
sector could generate a financial surplus to invest in industry in developing countries.  
4
 Some developing countries recognized the failure of the ambitious industrialization policy at 
a fairly early state, e.g. Tanzania. In the well known Arusha Declaration of 1967, which was a 
landmark in Tanzania’s early development, the main headlines were “we have put too much 
emphasis on industries” and “agriculture is the basis of development”. See Nyerere, 1968, 
231-250.  
5
 In India and Indonesia, for instance, introduction of high-yielding varieties in combination 
with appropriate fertilizer and water inputs resulted in an impressive increase in rice output 
over the last three decades. See e.g. Parikh et al., 1993, and Ellis, 1993. Many people were 
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results were less promising. Rates of adoption of high-yielding varieties were 
low. For crops like millet, sorghum and cassava, which are main food crops in 
many regions of Africa, high yielding varieties did not prove successful. 
Moreover, in many African countries the supply of agricultural inputs was not 
adequate6, and a proper infrastructure for agricultural research, extension 
services and planning was lacking. In fact, the growth of agricultural output 
during the last 25 years in Sub Saharan Africa has stagnated. The growth of the 
food production lags behind the demographic growth. Moreover, the export of 
cash crops has not been a motor for industrial development in Africa7. 
 
The state as the main actor 
There have been many debates on why agricultural growth stagnated in Africa. 
Important causes were certainly the food policies by national governments. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the political spectrum of regimes in Africa varied 
widely. Some regimes were based on Marxism-Leninism, e.g. the Dergue 
regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia, and the FRELIMO regime in 
Mozambique that came to power immediately after independence in 1975. Other 
regimes were inspired by variants of socialism, e.g. the African Socialism of 
Nyerere8 in Tanzania. Some countries in West Africa, such as Ivory Coast and 
Togo, remained under the strong influence of the former colonial power 
(France). Independent of the ideological colour of the regimes, the governments 
in almost all African countries appropriated a central role in the field of food 
policies. There were many reasons for that. As in the colonial days, the 
governments wanted farmers to supply food to the urban centres. Moreover, 
they wanted to extract a surplus from the farmers in order to finance 
infrastructure, the government’s administration and welfare services. In many 
countries, food was produced by peasants, who lived scattered all over the 
country. They applied traditional methods of cultivation, with land, labour and 
                                                                                                                                                        
critical about the Green Revolution, contending that it would make the rich farmers richer and 
poor farmers poorer. Although the use of improved seeds, fertilizer, water and pesticides 
requires considerable investments, the experiences in India and Indonesia show that many 
farmers have benefited. On the whole, therefore, the Green Revolution in these countries may 
be considered to be successful. For a critical review of the Green Revolution, see e.g. Lipton 
et al., 1989, and Hazell et al., 1991.  
6
 In some African countries, e.g. in Zimbabwe during the years after independence and in the 
1980s, a “ green revolution” took place in the household production of maize. Yields were 
more than doubled due to improved varieties and investments by the government in 
infrastructure and supply of inputs. Unfortunately, the system was not financially sustainable. 
“Nevertheless”, according to IFPRI/USAID, “ a key lesson from Zimbabwe’s experience is 
that a green revolution can occur in Africa, if smallholder farmers face the right incentives”. 
See IFPRI/USAID, 2002, p. 15, see also Byerlee and Eicher, 1997.  
7
 In the last thirty years the Sub-Saharan’s agricultural export earnings remained almost the 
same (whereas in south Asia, they were tripled), see IFPRI/USAID, 2002, p. 13. 
8
 See e.g. Nyerere, 1968. 
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rainfall being the main inputs. Production levels were accordingly low. The 
governments wanted to change these traditional farming systems. It was 
necessary to increase agricultural production and to introduce improved modes 
of production. How to do that, was a main question in the offices of the 
Ministries of Agriculture and funding agencies like the World Bank. And it is 
still a main question, as will be seen in this paper.  
 
In the early days of independence, different approaches were adopted. Some 
implied radical changes, such as the establishment of large state farms on which 
the work had to be done by wage labourers. This would facilitate the 
introduction of new agricultural methods, investment in equipment, access to 
markets, and the large farms could benefit from an economy of scale. Although 
in the beginning some state farms were successful, for instance sisal estates, 
many of them failed. The enforced establishment of co-operatives was another 
radical approach. A well-known example is the villagization programme in 
Tanzania in the late 1960s and early 1970s as part of the Ujamaa policy9 of 
Nyerere. It aimed at a transformation of rural areas into Ujamaa villages, 
wherein all political and economic activities would be collectively organized. 
People were to live together in a village, so that it would be easier to send 
children to school, and to organize water supply and other facilities. Communal 
organization of work would make farming more efficient, and a better use would 
be made of the results of agricultural research and extension services. The 
mobilization of peasants to set up such communities was a high priority for the 
government. Large campaigns were launched. The reactions were mixed. The 
strongest opposition was directed against the communal farming. Since the 
farmers’ response was disappointing, the government changed its policy. 
Villagization was made compulsory, all people had to move into a registered 
village. It was one of the largest settlement operations in Africa. It involved 
millions of people. Although the state-owned press and radio did not give 
publicity to incidents and resistance, it was revealed later that strong pressure 
and even violence had been used to enforce the villagization. The creation of 
Ujamaa villages became a failure. Within a couple of years the requirement that 
work was to be done collectively, was dropped. Even the name Ujamaa village 
was not longer used.  
 
The term ‘socialism from above’, which has often been used as a paraphrase for 
Ujamaa policies, reflects the main contradiction of ujamaa. Originally, the 
Ujamaa policy was supposed to be based on the initiatives of the farmers 
themselves. Self-help and mutual co-operation were the key words. The role of 
the government was to support such initiatives. Gradually, the initiatives were 
                                                 
9
 For a review and analysis of the failed Ujamaa policies in Tanzania, see Schweigman 
(2001). 
  8
taken by the government. Ujamaa became a process from above. The 
government wanted to ‘educate’ the advantages of communal activities. In 
retrospect, one may be surprised that this contradiction did not raise more 
discussion in Tanzania. This may be due to the lack of democracy. Although in 
the writings of Nyerere and official documents democracy is often mentioned 
(‘true socialism cannot exist without democracy’10), no publication was clear 
about the issue of what democracy really meant in the Tanzanian one-party 
system. The participation of the people themselves in introducing Ujamaa 
villages was never properly discussed in the public media, which were in the 
hands of the government. Top-down approaches replaced bottom-up approaches. 
The state became the exclusive actor. 
 
A second approach to introduce new methods of cultivation, applied in most 
African countries, was less radical. It envisaged a gradual improvement of 
practice on existing farms. It was acknowledged that the farmers wanted to stick 
to their family based farming systems11, on land inherited from their forefathers. 
The main problem was how the government could reach the individual farmers 
in an efficient way. Transfer of technology became the key concept. At 
agricultural experimental stations, agronomists tested new technologies. After 
successful trials, extension officers tried to introduce the innovations to the 
farmers. Sometimes field tests at the farm level were also carried out. Most of 
the time such a transfer of technology did not work out well. The approach was 
too much top down and the role of the experts as exclusive actors was 
increasingly challenged. It was realized that the farmers’ conditions and local 
knowledge should be taken as a starting point. ‘Farmers participation’ became a 
key word. In section 2 about Burkina Faso, such farmers’ participation will be a 
central issue.  
 
During the 1960s and the 70s the governments of most African countries wanted 
to have a firm control on the food market, to satisfy consumers in the urban 
centres and to be sure that the farmers would produce enough food. 
Governments were the main actors on the national food markets and they 
imposed official prices, both for consumers and producers. National marketing 
boards were installed, which bought from farmers via intermediaries12 and 
                                                 
10
 See Arusha Declaration, 1967, p. 234, in Nyerere, 1968. 
11
 There is limited literature on the comparison between the efficiency of large estate farms 
and small holder farms in Africa under comparable external conditions. According to a study 
by IFPRI/USAID, where reference is made to Lele and Agwal, 1989, “the efficiency of large 
farms quickly eroded once smallholder farms were permitted access to the same support 
services as those available to large farms”. See IFPRI/USAID, 2002, p. 25. The conclusion 
can only hold if no large mechanical equipment is involved. 
12
 The intermediaries were governmental departments in the regions, governmentally 
controlled cooperatives, or merchants authorized by the government. See e.g. Bryceson, 1999, 
p. 25 –27, Bassolet, 2000, p. 10-12. 
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subsequently sold to consumers, at fixed producer and consumer prices. In most 
African countries the management of these large organisations was not 
successful. Farmers were not paid in time, transport was delayed, etc. The price 
policies were also problematic. Since consumer prices were set low and levies 
had to be paid to governmentally controlled intermediaries, the farmers received 
a price that was too low. This discouraged13 farmers to invest in improved 
technology in order to increase production. So also in this case, the government 
was not successful as the exclusive actor on the food market.  
 
Structural Adjustment Programmes 
In the 1980s and 90s the ideas on the exclusive role of the state changed. By 
accepting the Structural Adjustment Programmes14, recommended or rather 
imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, in most developing countries the role 
of the state in the food market was severely reduced: markets were liberalized, 
marketing boards dismantled, and prices were no longer fixed by the 
government. The role of national governments was restricted to creating optimal 
conditions (infrastructure, transparent rules and regulations etc.) for a private 
market, to keeping a food safety stock and to organizing food aid. According to 
neo-liberal thinking, the free food market would reduce marketing costs, 
decrease consumer prices and increase producer prices, allowing farmers to 
invest in agriculture and to improve productivity. Many developing countries are 
now in the transition process to the free market.  
 
Food availability and access to food 
In 1986 the World Bank introduced a definition of food security, which has 
since then been widely used. Food security refers to ‘access by all people at all 
times to enough food for an active and healthy life’15. I would like to specifically 
draw your attention to the use of the term “access to”. In the 1970s, food 
security was associated with the availability and production of food. When, as a 
reaction to some calamitous droughts and famines in Africa, the first United 
Nations World Food Conference was held in Rome in 1974, the main 
occupation was the supply of food16. The recommendations of the conference 
focused on raising domestic production in order to achieve self-sufficiency, and 
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 The centrally governed policies were usually defended as protection against private traders, 
who in dysfunctional markets would ask excessive prices. In fact, the alleged market failures 
were replaced by government failures. See e.g. Lutz et al., 1999, p.144.  
14
 A large number of developing countries accepted the Structural Adjustment Programmes in 
order to be able to obtain loans by the Bretton Wood institutions under favourable conditions. 
15
 In 1996, during the World Food Summit a refined version of this definition was adopted: 
‘Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels, exists when 
all peoples at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. See 
FAO, 1996, World Food Plan of Action, point 1. 
16
 See e.g. Sijm, 1997, p. 7. 
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the creation of national and international safety-stocks. The shift in the 
international debate from its emphasis on ‘availability of food’ to ‘access to 
food’ is in large part due to the influence of Amartya Sen, who in the 1970s 
started to study causes of famines. Sen carried out a detailed study of the Great 
Bengal Famine of 194317, which had a death toll of about 3 million people. He 
scrutinized data on food production, stocks and imports; and information about 
victims and the role of the Bengal, Indian and British government. These 
governments had claimed that the famine was caused by a shortage of food (rice 
and wheat). Sen showed that during the famine period there was no shortage of 
food in the region. The famine made so many victims, because people had no 
access to food due to a failing distribution system, high food prices, and a lack 
of purchasing power. The worst affected groups were, amongst others, 
fishermen, transport workers, agricultural labourers, and low paid workers in 
various professions. Sen concludes that work programmes and other methods to 
increase the purchasing power of the people could have been a proper answer to 
help to prevent the famine. Sen and others also analyzed the famine in Ethiopia 
of 1972 – 1974, on the basis of existing reports and publications18. They 
concluded that on the national level during this period there was enough food for 
the whole country.  
 
These results show that access to food rather than food availability is of 
importance in an analysis of food security. Access to food implies the use of 
means to acquire food. Sen developed his “entitlements approach”19 as a theory 
to analyse these means. In studying food security, Sen’s approach calls for 
studies on disaggregate group or household levels. 
 
Democracy 
In his recent book Development as Freedom, published in1999, Sen states that 
famines have not occurred in democratic countries. Famines have occurred20 in 
colonial territories, in one-party states (for instance, the greatest recorded famine 
in history, which took place in China between 1958 and 1960 after the failure of 
the “Great Leap Forward”; the famines in the 1970s in Cambodia, in the 1990s 
in North Korea), and in countries under a military dictatorship (as in Ethiopia 
during the Dergue regime, in Somalia and Sudan). Most authoritarian rulers are 
not interested in taking measures to avert famines. Democratic governments, 
with a free press and political rights, are exposed to public criticism. These 
governments are accountable for actions they may, or may have not, taken to 
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 See Sen, 1981, Ch. 6. 
18
 See Sen, 1981, Ch. 7. 
19
 See Sen, 1981, Ch. 1, see also Sen, 1984, p.497, and Devereux, 1993, chapter 6 on the 
entitlement approach. 
20
 See Sen, 1999, p. 16, and Ch. 6 about The Importance of Democracy. See also Interview 
with Amartya Sen in Challenge, Jan.- Febr. 2000, p. 22 –31. 
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prevent famines. In view of the need for electoral support and their political 
survival these governments have to take action in case of a threat of famine. On 
a national level, freedom of speech, independent media and a strong civil society 
controlling the government’s policies are therefore important weapons against 
famine. 
 
After this short review, I want to discuss an example of the food security 
situation in Africa. Estimates by the World Bank and the FAO show that, 
although Africa is rapidly urbanizing, in Sub-Saharan Africa the rural 
population is, and in the near future will be, the most vulnerable group21, in 




2.  Food security on the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso. 
 
I will briefly describe the situation in the northern part22 of the densely 
populated Central Plateau in Burkina Faso. It is one of the poorest and most 
vulnerable regions of the world. The Mossi are the most important ethnic group 
in the region. Farmers apply traditional methods of agriculture. The main inputs 
are labour and land, and productivity is low. Farmers and their families try to be 
self-reliant in food production. They apply various strategies23 to cope with risks 
due to uncertain rainfall. Since many years, pressure on the land has been high; 
for two reasons. The growth of the rural population on the Central Plateau 
requires more land for new young farmers. Secondly, due to decreasing yield 
levels, individual farmers are forced to extend their land24. They cultivate as 
much as land as possible in order to produce enough for their families. Since 
most fertile land is already in use, farmers turn to marginal, less fertile land. 
 
In the past, cultivated land was left fallow during a number of years to restore 
soil fertility. Due to land shortage fallow periods have been shortened, 
sometimes even vanished, resulting in decreasing soil fertility and deteriorating 
soil conditions. In the long term this is not a good strategy, but in the short term 
farmers often have no choice in order to survive. 
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 See Cohen, 2001, p11. 
22
 In particular the provinces Yatenga, Bam and Sanmatenga. 
23
 For example by growing different varieties, by both late and early planting and other ways 
of “diversification”, and by keeping livestock as a financial reserve for a situation when crops 
fail. See e.g. Maatman, 2000.  
24
 The tendency to extend the cultivated area rather than intensify agriculture seems to 
contradict Boserup’s thesis that population pressure will lead to intensification. Even the 
introduction of animal traction on the Central Plateau contributed to extension rather than to 
intensification.  
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There is another reason why soil conditions on the Central Plateau are poor: 
rainfall. During the (only) rainfall season, from June to October/November, 
rains can be very heavy. On the slopes of the land, the water may run very fast, 
carrying away fertile top-soils and vegetation. Moreover, the water does not 
infiltrate into the soils. The consequences have been disastrous. Thousands of 
hectares have been lost due to erosion. Moreover, the water table in the region 
decreased at a fast rate. That many trees and brushwood were cut to provide 
wood for fuel strongly aggravated the environmental degradation.  
 
The low productivity levels and the deteriorating soil conditions are the main 
causes of the vulnerable food security situation on the Central Plateau.  
 
Fighting erosion. 
Since a long time, initiatives have been taken to fight soil degradation in the 
region. In the early 1960s, a large anti-erosion project, financed by the European 
Development Fund, was designed and executed by European firms. On a huge 
area of 120.000 of hectares long ditches were dug. The ditches were to deviate 
the runoff water to prevent erosion, or were designed to improve infiltration. 
The huge project was very expensive. The local population was not involved in 
the preparation and setting up of the project, and was not willing to maintain the 
ditches of the white people. The project became a notorious failure25 of 
exclusive actors, who did not take into account the views of the local population.  
 
During the 1970s, another large project was carried out on the Central Plateau, 
financed by i.a. the World Bank. This time, the project was in hands of national 
authorities26 and its execution was left to regional departments. The project 
focused on the construction of earthen dikes27 to control the water runoff. 
Although lessons were learned from the 1960s and an attempt was made to 
involve the villagers, the approach was still basically top-down. Technically, the 
dikes were not always well designed. Moreover, their main purpose was to 
deviate the water to prevent erosion, whereas the farmers needed the deviated 
water, especially during poor rainfall years. Many dikes were therefore 
destroyed by the villagers and later abandoned28. 
 
A breakthrough occurred in the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s. Improved 
technical measures to control water runoff against erosion and to improve 
infiltration were introduced, in particular stone bunds, see Fig.1. The stone 
                                                 
25
 For a review of the project, called GERES (Groupement Européen de Restauration des 
Sols), see Marchal, 1979, Reij, 1983, p. 21-23.  
26
 The “Fond de Développement Rural” with headquarters in Ouagadougou was responsible 
for the monitoring and financial management of the project. 
27
 About 40 to 50 cm high and at the base one meter wide. 
28
 For a review of the project, see Reij 1983, 24-27. 
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bunds have to be located on contour lines of the farmers’ fields. They can be 
constructed in several ways: rows of stones may be combined with ditches, and 
their size, as well as the distances between the rows, depends on the slopes. The 





Fig 1: Rock bunds on the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso 
Source: Reij et al., 2003. 
Measures to improve soil fertility refer to the use of organic matter, for instance 
animal manure, compost and plant residues. Specifically, the improved methods 
of zaï are to be mentioned. Zaï, which literarily means “water pocket”, is an 
intensive technique29, where holes are dug of a depth of 10 to 15 cm and a 
diameter of 15 to 20 cm. These planting pits are filled30 with organic manure. 
Traditionally, zaï is used to regenerate eroded fields. Zaï is illustrated in Fig.2.  
The digging of the zaï – holes and the supply of organic manure require a lot of 
labour, but it can be done at times when the farmers are not too busy, before the 
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 For a more detailed description of zaï, see e.g. Kaboré et al., 1994, Maatman et al., 1998, 
Reij, 1983, Reij et al. 2003.  
30
 In the 1970s, an illiterate farmer from the Yatenga region, Yacouba Sawadogo, started to 
experiment with the traditional zaï-planting pits by varying the size and putting manure in 
them. He even created an Association for the Promotion of zaï and organized ‘zaï markets’, 
where farmers could exchange their experiences with zaï, see Reij and Tchawa, 1999, p.5. 
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period of planting. During the last two decades rock bunds and zaï have been 
applied on a large scale in the northern provinces of the Central Plateau.  
Keeping livestock to produce manure, preparing compost and mulching the soil 
with plant residues can be done by individual farmers and their families. 
Projects, like the construction of rock bunds and the regeneration of degraded 
land by the application of zaï, however, usually require communal efforts, which 
in turn requires farmers’ or village organisations to be in place. Most of such 
projects are supported by either governmental or local or international non-
governmental organisations. They can only collaborate with farmers’ 




Figure 2: Zaï (water-pocket) on the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso 
Source: Reij et al., 2003. 
 
Farmers’ organisations 
One of the most important reasons for the breakthrough in the application of 
water- and soil management techniques was the organisation and participation of 
farmers. In 1966, Burkina Faso had created in all its eleven regions so-called 
Organizations for Regional Development31. They created village organisations, 
since 1974 formalized as Groupements Villageois. They aimed in particular at 
facilitating the dissemination of agricultural innovations. At present, you will 
                                                 
31
 Organismes Régionaux de Développement, ORDs. Extension of new agricultural 
technology was their first pre-occupation. Their mission was later extended to general 
development activities, like literacy campaigns, construction of infrastructure etc. Each region 
was divided in districts and sub-districts, each sub-district containing 6 à 8 villages. 
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find Groupements Villageois in the majority of the 8000 villages in Burkina 
Faso. Some of them were established by the villagers themselves, but the links 
with governmental structures are usually strong. Various national and regional 
projects, e.g. on forestry, were channelled by way of Groupements Vilageois. 
 
In 1961, Bernard Lédéa Ouédraogo, a former teacher, joined the government as 
trainer of rural youth in agriculture. In 1967, he left his job from one day to 
another. In a later interview32, he gave this explanation: 
 
“I was responsible for the training of the rural extension workers, and 
young farmers who had some kind of formal schooling. It was also my 
responsibility to supervise the “official” village groups organized by 
the government (and not by the farmers themselves). I did my best to 
help these groups, but I failed. So I tried to find out why I had not 
succeeded. What had happened?  
The rural extension workers would arrive in a village, and the only 
concern of the officially organized farmers was to take advantage of 
the donkeys, bullocks, carts, hoes, and other materials we would make 
available to them. There was nothing else behind this demeaning form 
of assistance, no vision, no global conception of development or of the 
rural world, no doctrine or philosophy. There had been no prior efforts 
at conscious raising. It was normal that in such a situation the farmers 
had but one concern: prime the state “pump” for all it was worth and 
cheat the extension workers”. 
 
B.L. Ouédraogo started to think of a completely new approach. He was inspired 
by the activities of some indigenous leaders in Yatenga. They struck different 
notes: participation, individual initiative and responsibility. As a sociologist, 
Ouédraogo started a study of the village organisation in the Mossi society. The 
birth of new village organisations, called Groupements Naam, was the result. 
Naam is a well-known term in Mossi society. It refers to groups of youngsters, 
who in the traditional Mossi society had to carry out useful tasks for the village. 
Without intervention by adults, they had to organize the work themselves, 
equality, solidarity and joint responsibility being leading principles. Such 
principles also became the base33 of the new village organisations Groupements 
Naam. The first six years, Ouédraogo met a lot of obstruction, in particular from 
government circles34, but finally he managed to develop the Naam movement 
into the largest peasant movement in West Africa, if not in the whole of Africa. 
At present, there are about 4.700 Groupements Naam in Burkina Faso35, the 
                                                 
32
 See Pradervand, 1989, p.19. 
33
 This is remarkable, since the Mossi society is extremely hierarchic.  
34
 See Pradervand, 1989, p. 20-21. 
35
 See Ouédraogo, B.L., 1989, p. 206. 
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majority of which are found in the Northern part of the central Plateau. The 
Naam movement is well structured36, several Groupements Naam form a Union 
and on a national level the Unions make up the Féderation des Unions de 
Groupements Naam. The Naam movement extended to other countries in 
Africa37 as well. The new organisations were particularly active in communal 
water and soil management projects, like the construction of stone bunds and zaï  
The Naam movement of the 1980s and 90s is often seen as a success story. 
Ouédraogo received several prestigious international prices. Its success was to a 
large extent due to the parallel foundation of the Non-Governmental 
Organization Six-S. The name Six-S means in French: Se Servir de la Saison 
Sèche en Savane et au Sahel. The name is revealing, it refers to the use of time 
during the dry season, when the farmers are not involved in agriculture, are 
under-employed and can spend their time to activities like the construction of zaï 
and rock bunds, as discussed above. Six-S supported Groupements Naam or 
farmers’ organisations, which had adopted similar approaches as Naam. The 
support consisted of training activities38, developing the negotiating power of 
farmers’ representatives and funding of projects. Six-S was run by local farmers’ 
representatives. Ouédraogo was and still is the President of Six-S. The 
Groupements Naam and the NGO Six-S attracted a large number of donors, both 
foreign governments39, non-governmental organisations and international 
organisations.  
 
Such developments and, in general, the changing ideas about farmers’ 
participation and the shift in emphasis on “participative learning” rather than on 
“transfer of technology”, had an impact on the government’s policies in Burkina 
Faso. One can think of, for example, the national agricultural research institute40, 
which in the 1980s established interdisciplinary research teams in various 
regions of the country. They work together with farmers, and try to make 
interactive learning a reality. Although their impact can only be limited due to 
the vast region covered, and a lack of resources, their role can still be pivotal. 
 
Assessment of the impact of the application of water and soil conservation 
methods 
Recently, the results of a thorough study41 assessing the impact of the 
application of water and soil conservation methods in the northern part of the 
                                                 
36
 For a description of the Naam Movement, see Ouédraogo, B.L., 1989, Ouédraogo, B.L., 
1990, Pradervand 1989, p. 20-23, see also Adam, 1993, p. 178 - 184  
37
 E.g. Mali, Senegal, Niger and Togo. 
38
 “Training in action” and “chantiers- écoles” became key concepts. 
39
 Since the beginning, through the Swiss Development Cooperation department DDA, the 
Swiss government has been one of the most important backers of Six-S. 
40
 Institut National de l’ Environnement et de Recherches Agricoles INERA. 
41
 See Reij and Thiombiano, 2003. 
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Central Plateau during the years 1980 – 2001 were published. Most of these 
methods consist of the construction of stone bunds and the application of zai. 
The methods were implemented through large public regional development 
programmes42, in which often Groupements Villageois were involved, or 
through private projects by farmers’ organisations supported by NGOs, such as 
Groupements Naam and Six-S. Water and soil conservation methods were 
applied on about 150.000 hectares, almost 35 to 40% of all the cultivated area. 
Thousands of hectares of degraded land have been regained. The authors show, 
on the basis of both quantitative evidence and farmers’ opinions, that the 
application of the water and soil conservation methods has increased yields of 
the main cereal crops sorghum and millet. This has contributed to an 
improvement of food security in the region. It was also observed that 
improvements in water and soil management allowed many farmers to diversify 
their production, allowing them to grow vegetables for sale. The farmers in the 
regions invest more and more in livestock in order to produce manure for 
fertilisation of the fields. The water tables in the region have risen. 
The authors conclude that the results are impressive43. Meanwhile, they 
emphasize that this is not the end of the story. A lot of land still lacks water and 
soil conservation structures, and the quality of all land has to be further 
developed. The productivity needs to be urgently increased in order to meet the 
demand for food. 
 
The positive experiences with the application of water and soil conservation 
methods on the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso, show that successful results can 
be attained, as soon as various actors do not behave like exclusive actors, but 
acknowledge each other’s specific role.  
 
 
3. Opportunities and Responsibilities 
 
The state has been the most prominent actor with exclusive claims. Whatever 
the motivations were, political ideology or economic dogmas, governments 
appropriated a central role. During many years, farmers were denied a say. By 
doing so, the farmers were deprived of a basic freedom: to participate in 
discussions, negotiations and the process of decision making about their own 
                                                 
42
 The methods were introduced as part of long term regional programmes, such as Projet 
Agroforestier, the PEDI project (Programmation et Exécution de Développement Integré) and 
the project CES/AGF (Conservation de l’ Eau et des Sols / Agroforesterie), on about 100.000 
hectares; and as result of other initiatives e.g. by farmers’ organizations supported by NGOs 
on about 50.000 hectares. See Reij et al., 2003, p.12.  
43
 It is interesting that they even recommend to regain degraded non-arable land by means of 
water conservation structures, in order to regenerate grazing land for cattle, see Reij et al., 
2003, p.77.   
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future. Such a freedom determines to a large extent the quality of life, and is an 
end in itself. This concurs with Sen’s well-known thesis that substantive 
freedoms are both ends and means of development.  
 
Farmers’participation has become a catchword. It is a complex issue44 though. 
Farmers’ participation needs organization. In this lecture the Naam movement in 
Burkina Faso served as an example of such an organization. It has had a strong 
impact. Similar to many enterprises, however, it runs the risk of becoming the 
victim of its own success. It is significant that internet searches on the Naam 
movement result in references to success stories only. The organisation runs the 
risk to develop into a bastion, organized in a top-down manner45, and so even 
itself to become an exclusive actor. Consider the following, written in a recent 
World Bank study about rural decentralisation in Burkina Faso46: 
“… there was also a notable absence of collaboration among the local 
organizations in Yatenga, even within the same village. For example, there was 
no coordination between Groupements Villageois and Groupements Naam even 
though both groups were undertaking similar projects in the village, usually with 
external state or NGO partners. At the same time, each of the groups tended to 
be exclusive in their membership patterns. In fact, researchers noted several 
village groups creating more than one organization with the same people to 
solve the same problem. This was explained as necessary because ‘each outside 
partner wanted their own groupement’”. 
It is unfortunate that there is a lack of transparency concerning the Naam’s 
positive and negative experiences. For outsiders it is an intriguing question to 
which extent the ideas of equality, solidarity and joint responsibility of the 
original Naam groups of youngsters, for example, were adopted by the Mossi 
farmers with their extreme hierarchic structures. 
Many people and organisations expect a lot from farmers’ participation. 
However, although farmers’ participation is necessary for agricultural 
development, it is not sufficient. Other actors may be equally important. This is 
manifest on the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso. In spite of the massive 
application of water and conservation methods, food production levels are still 
very low in this region. The farmers’ fertilization efforts are limited to organic 
material. It is well known, however, that restoration and maintenance of soil 
fertility and higher production levels can only be attained, if mineral fertilizers 
will be applied as well47. In Burkina Faso, as in other West African countries, 
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 See for a review of debates on farmers’ participation e.g. Musch, 2001;see also Uphoff, 
1993. 
45
 See e.g. Atampugre, 1996.  
46
 See Donnelly et al., 2001, p. 11. 
47
 The efficiency of the application of chemical fertilizers depends to a large extent on the 
optimal use of organic resources. Yield levels are a function of both organic and chemical 
fertilizer inputs, see for instance De Ridder et al., 1990. 
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however, a fertilizer market is lacking48. Whether it will be economically 
feasible for the farmers to apply fertilizers will depend on many factors, the 
possibility to produce an agricultural surplus for sale, the efficiency of the 
fertilizer markets, the quality of the fertilizers, prices, and many other factors.  
 
The introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes, with their strong 
emphasis on the market, has severely reduced the role of governments. Without 
under-estimating the serious social disruptions, caused by the cuts in 
governmental expenditures, it has to be acknowledged that the new way of 
thinking has blown a new wind through the affected economies. Farmers, 
traders, transporters, retailers seem to make maximal use of the new 
possibilities. For instance, on the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso, the 
introduction of water management methods has also resulted in the construction 
of a large number of small water reservoirs to be used for drinking water for 
cattle. Every inch of the borders is used to cultivate vegetables, which are often 
sold in urban centres.  
Of course, governments have still an important role to play. I do particularly 
refer to extension services and agricultural research. On the Central Plateau in 
Burkina Faso, the farmers can not do without.  
 
Conclusions 
I have reached my conclusions. It is not nature, which has to be blamed for the 
stagnation of food production in Africa. Enough evidence has been presented to 
justify the conclusion that “the illusion of the exclusive actor” is the most 
important reason of the stagnation. Opportunities for increased food security and 
sustainable agricultural development depend on a proper interaction between the 
various actors. This is certainly not a discovery, but it is the heart of the matter. 
This highly required interaction can be different from one region to another, 
from one stage of development to another, and will be of a complex nature. 
Opportunities can only be created if this complexity is taken into account.  
We have seen in the previous sections, that the exclusive role of actors was 
almost always accompanied by a lack of public discussion. It is certain that, on 
all levels, an environment of openness and transparency is the best breeding 
ground for initiatives that can create new opportunities. 
 
At the end of my lecture, I will make a few remarks on responsibilities. I will 
limit myself to the responsibility of academic people. In the past, serious 
mistakes have been made due to easy generalisations about the blessings of the 
state or the market. The consequences have been grave. Academic people have 
to warn for such generalisations. Academic contributions to development are 
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 The fertilizer supply for cash crops like cotton, is well organized and channeled through 
governmental organisations or parastatals. 
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required on a theoretical and on an applied level. On a theoretical level, new 
theories have to be developed, which are adapted to complex situations existing 
in developing countries. At an applied level, researchers have to interact with 
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